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Constitution and Dependence1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Material constitution is the relation that holds between an object and what it is made of. For 
example, statues may be constituted by lumps of matter, flags by colored pieces of cloth, and 
human persons (according to a prominent strand of theorizing about personal identity) by 
biological organisms. Constitution is often thought to be a dependence relation. I will later say 
more about what this means, but the rough idea is this. According to a popular picture, 
reality is hierarchically structured: some bits of it hang on other, metaphysically prior, bits. 
This hierarchy may be imposed by a number of relations, constitution being one of them. 
Thinking along these lines about constitution is fairly widespread. In the Stanford Encylopedia 
of Philosophy entry on material constitution, for instance, Ryan Wasserman writes that 
constitution is “taken to be a dependence relation”.2 For better or worse, he is right: 
 
                                                
1 For very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper I am grateful to Andrew Brenner, Dan Korman, 
Ariel Meirav, Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez, Noël Saenz, Cathy Sutton, Tuomas Tahko, two anonymous referees 
of this journal, and audiences at the 2018 Eastern APA in Savannah, the 2018 meeting of the Israeli 
Philosophical Association at the University of Haifa, and a conference titled “Issues on the (Im)possible VI” at 
the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava. I also thank Kathrin Koslicki for many helpful discussions about 
ontological dependence and hylomorphism, which helped me better understand not only her own views but 
also many of the core issues in this literature. 
2 “Material Constitution,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL 
= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/material-constitution/, §2. Wasserman’s remark 
concerns the state of the literature; his own considered view is that there is no such thing as an asymmetric 
relation of constitution (“The Constitution Question,” Noûs, XXXII, 4 (2004), 693–710). 
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“[W]hat is the precise nature of the particular dependence relation that holds between constitutionally 
related objects? Numerous dependence relations have been discerned in different areas of philosophy 
and in other disciplines…”3 
“[T]here must be more to constitution than mere coincidence, and in the literature, there are a 
number of attempts to make constitution a substantive relation […] All emphasize the dependence of 
the constituted object […] on the constituting matter…”4 
“Of course, grounding may not be the only relation of ontological priority, and so [the thesis that 
grounding is a relation between facts] is consistent with holding that things like statues depend 
ontologically on their constituent matter.” 5 
“Many pluralists who reject four-dimensionalism about objects in favour of three-dimensionalism 
adopt some version of the view that distinct, coinciding objects are intimately related by an 
asymmetrical dependence relation of constitution.”6 
 
Other philosophers, while they do not explicitly say that constitution is a dependence 
relation, nonetheless say things that have this consequence7 or make claims in the vicinity, 
for example that constitution is a “building relation”8 or that constituted objects are 
                                                
3 Kathrin Koslicki, “Constitution and Similarity,” Philosophical Studies, CXVII, 3 (2004): 327–364, at p. 340. 
4 Hagit Benbaji, “Material objects, constitution, and mysterianism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, XLVI, 1 (2008): 
1–26, at p. 8. 
5 Paul Audi “A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding,” in Fabrice Correia and Benjamin 
Schnieder, eds., Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp. 101–121, at p. 103. 
6 Thomas Sattig, The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the Ordinary World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), p. 83. 
7 Mark Johnston, “Hylomorphism,” Journal of Philosophy, CIII, 12 (2006): 652–698, at pp. 664–665 and 676–677. 
8 Karen Bennett, Making Things Up (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 9 and 21. 
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“nothing over and above” their constituters.9 
Why does it matter whether constitution is a dependence relation? First, it is natural to 
think of the world as having a hierarchically layered structure. Some of the relations apt to 
impose such hierarchy are relations of determination (currently grounding is the most 
popular among them).10 Others are relations of dependence. Whether constitution is a 
dependence relation helps us get one step closer to a complete taxonomy of the structuring 
relations that impose the layered hierarchy. Second, whether constitution is a dependence 
relation makes a difference to the metaphysical status of constituted objects. One might 
want to say, for example, that persons are fundamental composites.11 But if constitution is a 
dependence relation, this is incompatible with persons being constituted, since being 
dependent on something else is incompatible with being fundamental.12 Third, whether 
constitution is a dependence relation can make a difference to the extent to which the 
addition of constituted objects to one’s ontology is a cost in parsimony. Some think that we 
should only worry about minimizing the number of fundamentalia in metaphysical theory 
                                                
9 Wiggins “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time,” Philosophical Review, LXXVII, 1 (1968), 90–95, at pp. 
91–92. 
10 For a useful survey on grounding, see Ricki Bliss and Kelly Trogdon, Metaphysical grounding, in E. N. Zalta, ed., 
The Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/grounding/ 
11 See Lynne R. Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 
22; Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism,” Philosophical Studies, CLV, 1 (2011): 65–81; and Ross Inman, 
Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar: A Neo-Aristotelian Mereology (New York: Routledge, 2018), Ch. 7. 
Note that the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental entities does not commit one to the view 
that there are ways or degrees of existence. See Kris McDaniel, The Fragmentation of Being (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), Ch. 6 for an application of this more radical idea to persons. 
12 Though see Elizabeth Barnes, “Emergence and Fundamentality,” Mind, CXXI, 484 (2012): 873–901. 
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building; non-fundamental entities incur no cost.13 If constitution is a dependence relation, 
such theorists have less reason to refrain from positing constituted objects. 
Yet I will argue that it is surprisingly difficult to make a good case for the doctrine that 
constitution is a dependence relation. There are many definitions of constitution on the 
market, and given some widely accepted theses about ontological dependence, most of them 
fail to classify constitution as a dependence relation. As it turns out, the best option for 
those who want to avoid this result is to endorse the kind of mereological hylomorphism 
that has been put forth by Kit Fine14 and defended in detail by Kathrin Koslicki15: 
constituted objects have their constituters as proper parts along with a form, which is 
another proper part.16 
Before launching into substantive discussion, I should make a few clarifications. The 
question of whether constitution is a dependence relation is easy to trivialize. First, 
“constitution as identity” theorists like Harold W. Noonan17 think that constitution is just a 
special case of identity.18 Second, some believe that everything trivially ontologically depends 
                                                
13 See Jonathan Schaffer, “What Not to Multiply Without Necessity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XCIII, 4 
(2015): 644–664. 
14 “Things and Their Parts,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIII, 1 (1999): 61–74 
15 The Structure of Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Form, Matter, Substance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018) 
16 I reserve the word ‘hylomorphism’ exclusively for views that accept the existence of forms; for a broader 
usage, see Simon Evnine, Making Objects and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). As Evnine himself 
recognizes, this issue is purely terminological. 
17 “Constitution Is Identity,” Mind, CII, 405 (1993): 133–146 
18 A similar move is to identify constitution with the symmetric relation of material coincidence; see Michael 
Rea, “The Problem of Material Constitution,” Philosophical Review, CIV, 4 (1995): 525–552. 
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on itself.19 If we put these two strands of theorizing together, we get that constitution is a 
special case of identity, which in turn is a special case of ontological dependence. 
This is not the sense in which I am interested in whether constitution is a dependence 
relation. What I want to know is whether constitution is the kind of asymmetric, irreflexive 
structuring relation that paradigmatic cases of ontological dependence are usually thought to 
be. This means that I also will not worry about putative cases of symmetric dependence.20 
Even if such cases are possible, constitution counts as a dependence relation in my sense 
only if every constituted object depends on its constituter, but not vice versa. That is, I am 
interested in the following question: 
 
The Constitution-Dependence Link Question (CDLQ): Is it the case that constituted 
objects ontologically depend on their constituters, but not vice versa? 
 
How can we go about answering CDLQ? The most straightforward method would be to go 
through each possible combination of accounts of constitution and ontological dependence 
and see what they imply for CDLQ. Unfortunately, this is not feasible in the length of this 
paper. So instead, I will proceed according to the following plan. In section 2, I will lay out 
some diagnostics for ontological dependence. Despite much disagreement about the relation, 
the broad consensus is that it should be answerable to at least one of three core constraints, 
                                                
19 Peter Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 295; Amie L. Thomasson 
Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 26; Tuomas E. Tahko and E. J. Lowe, 
“Ontological Dependence,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., 
URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/dependence-ontological/,  §4.2. 
20 See Elizabeth Barnes, “Symmetric Dependence,” in Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest, eds., Reality and Its 
Structure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 50–69. 
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which I will call the Modal, the Inclusion and the Feature Constraints. While each constraint 
is somewhat controversial, their disjunction is not: virtually everyone agrees that each 
instance of ontological dependence has to satisfy at least one of them. In section 3, I will 
argue that all bona fide instances of constitution violate the Feature Constraint and that some 
also violate the Modal Constraint. So, for constitution to count as a dependence relation, at 
least those instances that violate both would need to satisfy the Inclusion Constraint. 
However, in section 4 I will argue that most non-hylomorphist accounts of constitution also 
violate the Inclusion Constraint. The only exception is Lowe’s Proper Parthood Account, 
which I will argue should be ruled out on independent grounds because it violates Weak 
Supplementation. As we will see in section 5, only a mereological form of hylomorphism 
satisfies the Inclusion Constraint. This constraint is merely a necessary condition of 
ontological dependence. However, I will argue that there are substantive and defensible 
accounts of ontological dependence on which it is also necessary. This means that only 
mereological hylomorphists are in a good position to maintain that constitution is a 
dependence relation. 
 
II. DIAGNOSTICS FOR ONTOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE 
Ontological dependence received considerable attention in the last few years. As a highly 
general, category-neutral relation, it is widely thought to hold between sets and their 
members, structured events and their constituents, tropes and their bearers, boundaries and 
their hosts, and so on.21 
                                                
21 Fabrice Correia, “Ontological Dependence,” Philosophy Compass, III, 5 (2008): 1013–1032, Kathrin Koslicki, 
“Ontological Dependence: An Opinionated Survey,” in Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder and Alex 
Steinberg, eds., Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence (Munich: 
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A closer look reveals two markedly different strands in the ontological dependence 
literature. Some philosophers, whom I will call “pluralists”, think of ontological dependence 
as a genus of relations with various species in it.22 They often distinguish between rigid and 
generic dependence, existential and identity dependence, timeless and temporal forms of 
dependence, and so on. “Monists”, by contrasts, are only concerned with the generic notion 
of ontological dependence.23 While monists and pluralists agree that no kind of ontological 
dependence can be defined in purely modal terms, views on how ontological dependence (or 
its species) should be characterized are quite diverse, ranging from primitivism24 to essence-25 
                                                                                                                                            
Philosophia, 2013), pp. 31–64, and Tahko and Lowe, “Ontological Dependence,” op. cit., provide helpful 
overviews. 
22 See E.J. Lowe, “Ontological Dependency,” Philosophical Papers, XXIII, 1 (1994): 31–48, Kit Fine, “Ontological 
Dependence,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XLV, 1 (1995): 269–90, Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphyisics, op. 
cit., Ch. 2, Fabrice Correia, Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2005) and 
“Ontological Dependence,” op. cit., Benjamin Schnieder, “A certain kind of trinity: dependence, substance, 
explanation,” Philosophical Studies, cxxix, 2 (2006), 393–419, Kathrin Koslicki, “Varieties of Ontological 
Dependence,” in Correia and Schnieder, Metaphysical Grounding, op. cit., pp. 186–213 and “Ontological 
Dependence,” op. cit., and Tahko and Lowe, “Ontological Dependencem,” op. cit. 
23 See Ross P. Cameron, “Turtles all the way down: regress, priority and fundamentality,” Philosophical Quarterly, 
LVIII, 230 (2008): 1–14; Jonathan Schaffer, “On what grounds what,” in David Chalmers, David Manley and 
Ryan Wasserman, eds., Metametaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 347–383; Alexander 
Paseau, “Defining Ultimate Ontological Basis and the Fundamental Layer,” Philosophical Quarterly, LX, 238 
(2010): 169–175; and Barnes, “Emergence and Fundamentality” and “Symmetric Dependence,” op. cit. 
24 Thomasson, “Fiction and Metaphysics,” op. cit., Ch. 2, Michael Potter, Set Theory and its Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), at pp. 39–40, Schaffer, “On what grounds what,” op. cit., Barnes, “Emergence 
and Fundamentality,” op. cit., at p. 879. 
25 Fine, “Ontological Dependence,” op. cit., Koslicki, “Varieties of Ontological Dependence,” op. cit. 
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and grounding26-based definitions. Instead of trying to settle these debates, I will focus on a 
few diagnostic criteria from which, I believe, we can crystallize an uncontroversial necessary 
condition of ontological dependence. 
II.1. The Modal Constraint. Most theorists agree that the ontological dependence of any x 
on any y implies that x in some way modally constrains y. Based on the most commonly cited 
examples, this is likely to take either of two forms, widely known as ‘Rigid Necessitation’ and 
‘Generic Necessitation’. Henceforth, I will use ‘D’ for the relation of ontological 
dependence, ‘E’ for the existence predicate (on which more in a moment) and ‘ᴪ’ as a 
second-order variable that ranges over kinds.  
Constitution and parthood are usually treated as time-relative relations, and sometimes 
so is ontological dependence. However, since the time-relative nature of these relations will 
not play any significant role in the discussion to follow, I will henceforth leave time indices 
implicit in my formal definitions. We can then formulate Rigid and Generic Necessitation as 
follows: 
 
(Rigid Necessitation) ∀x∀y [Dxy → □(Ex → Ey)] 
(Generic Necessitation) ∀x∀y {[Dxy → ∃ᴪ [ᴪy & □(Ex → ∃z ᴪz)]} 
 
Rigid Necessitation says that for any x and y, if x ontologically depends on y then necessarily, 
if x exists so does y. Put intuitively, the principle requires that an ontologically dependent 
entity necessitate the existence of that very thing that it depends on. By contrast, Generic 
Necessitation requires that there be some kind the dependee falls under such that the 
                                                
26 Correia, “Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions,” op. cit., at p. 66; cf. Schnieder, “A certain kind of 
trinity”, op. cit. 
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dependent thing’s existence necessitate the existence of some instance or other of that kind. I 
will understand the word ‘kind’ broadly. I will not require the kind in question to be y’s 
“primary kind”, that is, the kind to which it most fundamentally belongs (see section 4.1). I 
will, however, assume that kinds need to be something more specific than thing or material 
object.27 To give a sense of what I have in mind, here are some examples. ‘Person’, ‘elm tree’, 
‘Homo Sapiens’, ‘boy scout’, and ‘caterpillar’ are all kind terms. Some of them are typically 
considered “substance kinds” (nothing can stop being a member of them without going out 
of existence), whereas others are usually thought to be “phase sortals” (things can cease to 
belong to them but keep persisting). Some are arguably “infima species” (kinds that do not 
have more specific sub-kinds), while others are not. But they could all be used to formulate 
bona fide dependence theses. 
Rigid and Generic Necessitation correspond to the two species of ontological 
dependence most commonly distinguished by pluralists: rigid and generic dependence. But 
one does not need to be a pluralist to think that each instance of ontological dependence 
implies a respective instance of one of these necessitation theses. Note also that theses about 
rigid and generic dependence are largely independent from each other: the Sacramento Zoo 
only generically depends on its animals but does not rigidly depend on any particular animal; 
moreover, it rigidly depends on the state capital Sacramento but does not generically depend 
on Sacramento as a state capital (it could have been in Sacramento without the latter being a 
                                                
27 One reason to think this is the so-called “qua problem”: kind terms should help secure determinate 
reference, but words as broad as ‘thing’ and ‘object’ fail to achieve that. See Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny, 
Language and Reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), at pp. 79–80 and Amie L. Thomasson, Ordinary 
Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at pp. 38–42. See also Kris McDaniel, The Fragmentation of Being, 




Call the thesis that each instance of ontological dependence satisfies either Rigid or 
Generic Necessitation the 
 
(Modal Constraint) ∀x∀y {Dxy → [□(Ex → Ey) ∨ ∃ᴪ (ᴪy & □(Ex → ∃z ᴪz))]} 
 
The Modal Constraint seems highly plausible. Ontological dependence is often introduced 
with modal idioms: x ontologically depends on y when x “needs” y to exist or x “requires” a 
thing of the same kind as y to exist. It was once widely accepted that the modal idioms in 
these characterizations could be used to define (respective species of) ontological 
dependence.28 Such analyses are widely rejected today, mostly due to influential 
counterexamples by Fine.29 Some sort of modal connection nonetheless seems at least 
necessary for any kind of ontological dependence.30 
The formulations of both Rigid and Generic Necessitation explicitly use an existence 
predicate. Before moving on, it is worth saying a few words about this device.31 Since Rigid 
and Generic Necessitation are supposed to be non-trivial theses (many pairs of entities do 
not stand in the relations defined by them), the existence predicate is intended to be non-
                                                
28 Such analyses have been endorsed by Jeffrey Tlumak, “Cross-Categorical Priority Arguments,” Metaphilosophy, 
XIV, 1 (1983): 32–39, Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz, Substance among other categories (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), at pp. 95–6, and Peter Simons, “Farewell to Substance: A Differentiated 
Leave-Taking,” Ratio, XI, 3 (1998), 235–252, at p. 236, among others. 
29 “Ontological Dependence,” op. cit. 
30 See Correia, Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions, op. cit., for a detailed attempt to work these out. 
31 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for demanding more clarity on the role of the existence predicate in 
different notions of ontological dependence. 
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trivial in the sense that ∀xEx is not a theorem. This appears to confer commitment to a 
framework of possible worlds with variable domains of quantification. It is worth pointing 
out that while most theorists of ontological dependence are happy to take on this 
commitment32, those who prefer a fixed-domain framework have ways to interpret the 
existence predicate so that Rigid and Generic Necessitation still come out non-trivial. I will 
briefly survey three such options. In doing so, I will focus on reinterpreting Rigid 
Necessitation; Generic Necessitation can also be understood in obviously analogous ways. 
One strategy is to adopt the necessitist thesis that necessarily everything is identical 
something but that concrete things could have been nonconcrete.33 That is, each possible 
world has the same domain of quantification, but the elements of the domain may differ 
from world to world with respect to whether they are concrete. The existence predicate can 
then be understood to express exists as a concrete object: Rigid Necessitation says that for any x 
and y, if x ontologically depends on y then necessarily, if x exists as a concrete object then so 
does y.34 
                                                
32 See, for example, Fine, “Ontological Dependence,” op. cit., at p. 270, Correia, Existential Dependence and Cognate 
Notions, op. cit., at pp. 18–19 and “Ontological Dependence,” op. cit., at pp. 1014–1015, Koslicki, “Ontological 
Dependence,” op. cit., at p. 38, and Tahko and Lowe, “Ontological Dependence,” op. cit., §2. 
33 Bernard Linsky and Ed Zalta, “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic,” Philosophical Perspectives, 
VIII (1994): 431–58 and “In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete,” Philosophical Studies, LXXXIV, 2–3 
(1996): 283–94; Timothy Williamson, Modal Logic as Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
34 Strictly speaking these reinterpretations of Rigid and Generic Necessitation are not fully adequate, since they 
only capture ontological dependence between objects that are actually concrete. However, this suffices for our 
present purposes, since the relata of material constitution are concrete objects (though see Harbecke’s account 
in section 4.2). A more general reinterpretation could go like this. Call a relatum’s concreteness status its property 
of being concrete (for concrete objects) or abstract (for abstract objects). Then necessitists can understand 
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The second strategy ensures a fixed domain of quantification by stipulating that the 
elements of the domain are not objects but individual natures (for example, not Alvin 
Plantinga but the property of being Alvin Plantinga). The idea is that even if an object is not 
contained by every possible world, its individual nature is; however, that individual nature is 
instantiated only in some worlds, namely those where it is appropriate to say that the 
respective object exists.35 This view largely mirrors the necessitist approach, but talk of 
necessarily existing but only contingently concrete objects gets replaced with talk of 
necessarily existing but only contingently instantiated individual natures. Rigid Necessitation 
then comes down to the following thesis: for any x and y, if x ontologically depends on y 
then necessarily, if x’s individual nature is instantiated then y’s individual nature is 
instantiated. 
Finally, one could combine fixed domains of quantification with Rigid and Generic 
Necessitation by adopting a kind of context-insensitive counterpart theory. In a nutshell, 
unrestricted quantifiers range over the totality of all possible worlds, and de re modal 
statements are interpreted in terms of world-bound objects bearing counterpart relations to 
                                                                                                                                            
Rigid Necessitation as follows: for any x with concreteness status C and y with a concreteness status C*, if x 
ontologically depends on y then necessarily, if x has C then y has C*. Mutatis mutandis for Generic Necessitation. 
(Note that contemporary necessitists do not identify ‘nonconcrete’ and ‘abstract’.) 
35 This view is inspired by Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) and has first 
been formulated (though not endorsed) by Karen Bennett, “Proxy ‘Actualism’,” Philosophical Studies, CXXIX, 2 
(2006), 263–94. But as Bennett points out, it is not Plantinga’s own view. Plantinga does posit individual 
natures, but the elements of his domains of quantification are their instances rather than these natures 
themselves. Thus, Plantinga’s quantifiers are variable-domain rather than fixed-domain. Bennett’s modified 
version, in which the elements of the domain are the individual natures themselves, is what she dubs the 
“Linsky-Zaltafied” version of Plantinga’s view. 
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objects in other possible worlds. This much is familiar from the work of David Lewis36 
(those who shy away from embracing his modal realism can instead think of counterparts as 
abstract representations rather than full-fledged objects). However, Lewis’s own treatment of 
de re modal claims was context-sensitive: objects can have the same property necessarily and 
contingently relative to the counterpart relation specified. Such treatment of de re modality is 
alien to the thinking of most theorists of ontological dependendece, but fortunately a handy 
fix is available. Laurie Paul offered a context-insensitive version of counterpart theory 
according to which objects have their necessary properties necessarily in virtue of their 
counterparts being represented as having those properties in every possible world, but the 
counterpart relation is invariant across contexts.37 In defending this view, Paul accounts for 
the shiftiness of our modal intuitions by endorsing a plenitude ontology of objects: our 
intuition regarding whether Queen Elizabeth necessarily stems from a particular sperm and 
egg is unstable because there is an object (Elizabeth1) each counterpart of which is 
represented as originating from the same sperm and egg and an overlapping object 
(Elizabeth2) that has counterparts represented as originating from a different sperm and egg, 
and our use of the name ‘Elizabeth’ is indeterminate between them.  Thus on Paul’s context-
invariant counterpart theory, Rigid Necessitation gets reinterpreted as the following non-
trivial principle: for any x and y, if x ontologically depends on y then in any possible world w 
in which x has a counterpart, y has a counterpart too. Likewise for Generic Necessitation. 
There may be further strategies; by briefly presenting these ones, my goal has been to 
show that even philosophers with an antecedent commitment to fixed-domain quantifiers 
can make sense of Rigid and Generic Necessitation without trivializing them. All they need 
                                                
36 On the Plurality of Worlds (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986) 
37 “The context of essence,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, LXXXII, 1 (2004): 170–84 
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to do is find the right interpretation of ‘exists’. Depending on one’s preferred fixed-domain 
strategy, ontological dependence may have consequences for the dependee object’s 
concreteness status, the instantiation of its individual nature or the presence of a counterpart 
of it in other possible worlds. Either way, ontological dependence has modal consequences 
that are relevantly analogous to face-value readings of Rigid and Generic Necessitation. 
II.2. The Inclusion/Feature Constraint. As Koslicki has observed, bona fide cases of 
ontological dependence appear to fall into either of two categories.38 The first includes cases 
of what she calls ‘constituency,’ where the dependent thing is a compound of the entities it 
depends on. Complex events and propositions, sets, and certain structured wholes (for 
example molecules) belong here: they ontologically depend on the entities they are made up 
of. Instead of ‘constituency’ (which sounds confusingly similar to ‘constitution’), I will refer 
to the first group of cases of inclusion. Many instances of ontological dependence feature 
what I will call “inclusive relations”: the dependent entity includes the entities it depends on 
as components of some sort. 
Can we say anything more precise? Although Koslicki does not give a detailed positive 
characterization of inclusion, she warns us not to construe it along mereological lines.39 Sets, 
for example, plausibly depend on their members but do not have them as parts; and one 
might make similar claims about the relation between structured propositions and their 
components or properties and their bundles. Now, one could argue here that there is room 
to treat all cases as instances of proper parthood; we just need to accept a kind of 
mereological pluralism flexible enough to accommodate relata of diverse ontological 
                                                
38 “Varieties of Ontological Dependnece,” op. cit. 
39 Ibid., at p. 204, n17 
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categories.40 Adherents of such a pluralist view can understand inclusive relations simply as 
relations of proper parthood, where ‘proper parthood’ is used in the broadest possible sense 
to refer to a category-neutral relation that comes in several species, perhaps each obeying a 
different set of mereological principles. Those of a more conservative theoretical bent can 
still explain inclusion by piggybacking on the pluralist’s notion of proper parthood: a relation 
is inclusive, they could say, just in case it is either (i) proper parthood (in the traditional sense 
in which it is a relation restricted to material objects) or (ii) one of the relations that 
mereological pluralists (mistakenly, from these theorists’ point of view) consider species of 
proper parthood, such as propositional containment, property-bundling, and so on. 
The previous paragraph’s last sentence ends with the phrase ‘and so on’. This is because 
it is impossible to give a complete list of inclusive relations without making controversial 
assumptions about the nature of propositions, the ontology of properties, and other 
substantive issues in metaphysics. Fortunately, for my present purposes we do not need to. 
This is because the variety of ways in which a relation could be inclusive is limited by what 
kinds of things it can take as relata, and there is near-universal consensus that the relata of 
constitution are concrete material things. This rules out more exotic inclusive relations, such 
as set membership or property-bundling, and leaves only one salient option on the table: if 
constitution is inclusive, it is a special case of proper parthood (in the sense restricted to 
material things).41 
I hope to have said enough to clarify the notion of inclusion at issue. However, Koslicki 
also argues that many other instances of ontological dependence do not fit the inclusion 
                                                
40 Cf. Kit Fine, “Towards a Theory of Part,” Journal of Philosophy, CVII, 11 (2010): 559–89. 
41 I will relax this assumption when discussing Harbecke’s account of constitution in section 4.2, which 
construes the relation as one between sets and material objects. 
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model. Tropes, boundaries and holes are often thought to depend on their “hosts” or 
“bearers” but are not made up of them. For this reason, Koslicki distinguishes a second type 
of ontological dependence, which she calls “feature-dependence”: tropes, boundaries and 
holes are features of what they depend on. Feature-dependence arguably involves “superficial” 
entities we tend not to think of as things in their own right. As in the case of inclusion, 
Koslicki does not give a precise characterization of what it takes for something to be feature-
dependent; nor will I try to do so here. Instead, I will use the following heuristic: when y is 
feature-dependent on x, it is appropriate to say that y is “the y of x”. This heuristic yields the 
right result for the core cases (boundaries, holes and tropes are boundaries, holes and tropes 
of their bearers), and I will rely on it in what follows. 
Koslicki is a pluralist, but we do not have to follow her in that regard in order to 
appreciate that all cases of ontological dependence appear to involve either inclusion of 
feature-dependence. Call this the Inclusion/Feature Constraint (henceforth I will use ‘I’ and ‘F’ 
as predicates for inclusion and feature-characterization, respectively): 
 
(Inclusion/Feature Constraint) ∀x∀y [(Dxy → (Ixy ∨ Fxy)] 
 
In words: for any x and y, if x ontologically depends on y then x either includes y as a 
component or characterizes y. Although it is plausible to think that both the Modal Constraint 
and the Inclusion/Feature Constraint are true, the argument I will make in the next few 
sections requires only a much weaker assumption, which I will call the 
 
(Disjunctive Constraint) 
If x ontologically depends on y, then 
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a) x and y satisfy the Modal Constraint or 
b) x includes y as a component or 
c) x characterizes y 
 
Or more formally:  
 
∀x∀y {Dxy → [□(Ex → Ey) ∨ ∃ᴪ (ᴪy & □(Ex → ∃z ᴪz)) ∨ Ixy ∨ Fxy]} 
 
It should be evident how weak the Disjunctive Constraint is: all it demands is that each 
instance of ontological dependence satisfy at least one of the previously specified constraints. 
Still, one might wonder whether even this disjunctive condition demands too much from 
ontological dependence.42 After all, constitution is an asymmetric relation that entails but is 
not entailed by spatiotemporal coincidence. Coincidence is symmetric, but (one might think) 
there are plenty of asymmetric conditions other than b), c) and a) (assuming in this last case 
that the modal constraint does not hold symmetrically) which, combined with coincidence, 
yield an asymmetric of relation. My answer is that to get CLDQ we need more than just an 
account of the asymmetry of constitution: we need an account of why constitution is an 
asymmetric dependence relation. Defining a constitution-like relation so as to ensure its 
asymmetry is easy43: any asymmetric relation combined with coincidence could do the job. 
Let’s say, for example, that x schmepends on y if x spatiotemporally coincides with y and the 
first letter of the English word for x comes before the first letter of the English word for y in 
                                                
42 Thanks to an anonymous referee for forcefully pressing this concern. 
43 Although some, most notably Wasserman (“The Constitution Question,” op. cit.), deny that it is possible in 
the case of constitution. 
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the Latin alphabet. Schmependence is obviously not a kind of dependence, although it is 
assuredly an asymmetric relation. Now, of course, extant accounts of constitution do not fail 
as spectacularly at capturing a notion of dependence as does schmependence. But as we will 
see in section 4, they are problematic for similar reasons: although they impose the desired 
asymmetry of constitution via metaphysical relations rather than the alphabetic order of the 
relata’s names, they do not thereby establish that constitution is an asymmetric dependence 
relation. 
Constitution may be an asymmetric relation without being an asymmetric dependence 
relation. To also qualify as the latter, it needs to bear at least one of the commonly accepted 
marks of dependence: it needs to have one of the modal profiles assigned to dependence 
relations or be an inclusion relation or be a feature-characterizing relation. Which is to say, it 
needs to satisfy the Disjunctive Constraint; nothing else and nothing less will do. 
 
III. TESTING CONSTITUTION AGAINST THE DIAGNOSTICS: NARROWING DOWN THE OPTIONS 
If constitution is a dependence relation, each instance of it satisfies at least one clause of the 
Disjunctive Constraint. Fortunately, we can simplify the task of evaluating which theories of 
constitution satisfy this constraint by ruling out most logically possible ways they could do 
so. 
First, constitution never satisfies Rigid Necessitation. This is obvious from one of the 
standard motivations for constitution: constituted objects are mereologically more flexible 
than mere sums. While sums are usually thought to be set-like in having their parts 
necessarily, the objects they constitute can gradually undergo even a complete change of 
parts. Constituted objects are also mereologically flexible across possible worlds: it is possible for 




One might think constitution still obeys Generic Necessitation: surely constituted 
objects require the existence of some sum or other. While this may be true of sums, it does not 
generalize to other possible constituters. For example, according to the constitution theory 
of persons, human persons are contingently constituted by organisms but could have been 
constituted by detached cerebra.44 Moreover, it is hard to find a broader kind of thing human 
persons are necessarily constituted by. For example, it is far from clear why we would even 
need to be constituted by biological tissue instead of, say, robots.45 
One does not have to accept this example to be convinced that constitution does not 
always come with generic necessitation. When an object is constituted by something other 
than a mereological sum, it often is not true of any particular kind that necessarily if the 
constituted object exists then so does an object of that kind. For example, an art installation 
might be constituted by a shoe but could have been constituted by an entirely different kind 
of object. Jeremy Bentham’s auto-icon used to be constituted by Bentham’s dead body, but 
its head has been replaced by a wax replica and in an alternative history the auto-icon could 
have entirely stopped being constituted by organic material. Cases like these could be 
multiplied; in none of them is there any kind to which the actual constituter belongs and an 
instance of which has to exist for the constituted object to exist. 
Since all instances of constitution violate Rigid Necessitation and at least some violate 
Generic Necessitation, for constitution to be a dependence relation, the latter instances need 
to satisfy the Inclusion/Feature Constraint: if constituted objects ontologically depend on 
                                                
44 See Sydney Shoemaker, “Self, Body and Coincidence,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volume LXXIII, 1 (1999): 287–306 and Baker, “Persons and Bodies,” op. cit., Chs. 4–5. 
45 Baker (“Persons and Bodies,” op. cit., at p. 113) explicitly allows for the possibility of inorganic persons. 
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their constituters, they either characterize or include these constituters. We can quickly rule 
out the former: constituted objects are not features of their constituters. It is incorrect to say 
that a statue is the statue of its constituent lump or that a person is a person of its organism. 
Constituted objects are material objects, which are not the kind of “second rate” denizens of 
reality that boundaries, hosts or tropes are often thought to be.46 
This narrows down our options to b): if constitution is a dependence relation, 
constituted objects include their constituters as components. And so long as constitution is a 
relation between objects or between an object and its matter, the kind of inclusion at issue 
should be proper parthood (in the narrow sense restricted to material objects). But as I will 
show in the next section, the notion that constituted objects include their constituters is 
much harder to substantiate than usually thought. 
 
IV. THE INCLUSION CONSTRAINT VS. ACCOUNTS OF CONSTITUTION 
If constitution is a dependence relation, those instances that violate Generic Necessitation 
have to satisfy the Inclusion Constraint. Do they? Below I will focus on the broader question 
of whether constitution in general satisfies the Inclusion Constraint. This will do no harm, 
since everything I will say carries over to the special case of constitution-without-Generic 
Necessitation. 
Whether constitution implies inclusion hangs on what constitution is. Up to this point it 
was possible to postpone the issue, but now we have to address it head-on. This section will 
divide into two parts, in which I will discuss broadly modal and broadly mereological (but 
non-hylomorphist) accounts of constitution, respectively. This division is somewhat 
                                                
46 Cf. Dean W. Zimmerman, “Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution,” Philosophical Review, CIV, 1 
(1995): 53–110, at pp. 91–92. 
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arbitrary; as we will see, some accounts involve both modal and mereological elements. Still, 
the grouping is intuitive, and either way it plays no role in my argument. 
IV.1. Broadly modal accounts of constitution. The earliest modal account of constitution is the 
Destruction Account, which was proposed by Frederick Doepke47 and further developed by 
Peter Simons. The following formulation is based on Simons’: 
 
(Destruction Account) x constitutes y iff 
(D1) x materially coincides with y, 
(D2) x could survive y’s total destruction48 
 
Both phrases require explanation. Simons’ own phrasing is that “x could be a substratum of 
y’s total destruction”.49 It is clear from the context that by ‘substratum’ he means something 
like “that which would remain”, not substratum (“bare particular”) in the strict metaphysical 
sense. With this, Simons intends to convey two separate conditions. The first one is that x 
could survive y’s “total destruction”, where what counts as total is context-dependent; for a 
thing to be totally destroyed it is neither necessary nor sufficient for all of its proper parts to 
be destroyed. For example, a stone wall survives complete replacement of its proper parts 
but is completely destroyed by laying out its composing stones on the ground.50 The second 
idea is that in some sense, x and y coincide. For our present purposes, by this we can mean 
                                                
47 “Spatially Coinciding Objects,” Ratio, XXIV (1982: 45–60) 
48 I am omitting Simons’s time indices. 
49 Simons, Parts, op. cit., at p. 238 
50 Ibid., at pp. 239–40 
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complete sharing of proper parts.51 More precisely, using ‘N’ for coincidence and ‘PP’ for 
proper parthood, we can define coincidence as follows: 
 
∀x∀y [Nxy ↔ ∀z(PPzx ↔ PPzy)] 
 
In words: for any objects x and y, x coincides with y iff any proper part of x is a proper part 
of y and vice versa (this also implies that identity is a special case of coincidence). Simons’s 
Destruction Account gives us no reason to think that constitution satisfies the Inclusion 
Constraint. The only inclusion-like relation it requires between constituted objects and their 
constituters is material coincidence, which (as defined above) is symmetric and therefore 
does not count as inclusion in the intended sense. What I am interested in is whether the 
relation between constituted objects and their constituters satisfies the Disjunctive 
Constraint via the Inclusion Constraint, and no symmetric relation can ensure that it does. 
Now, to be fair, according to Doepke’s own version of the view constituted objects do not 
coincide with their constituters in the sense defined above; although they have a common 
decomposition into the same parts, Doepke maintains that constituted objects have proper 
parts their constituters lack (for example I am constituted by a mass of matter that does not 
have my heart as a part). But to streamline the discussion, I will put this complication to the 
side for the time being. Since E.J. Lowe made a similar kind of mereological asymmetry 
                                                
51 Wasserman, “The Constitution Question,” op. cit., at p. 700. Another common definition is in terms of 
complete sharing of parts. But that definition implies that coincident objects have each other as improper parts 
(since each object has itself as an improper part), and I prefer to stay neutral about that (for the moment at 
least). Either way, those who believe in coincidence are committed to rejecting the extensionalist commitment 
that complete part-sharing suffices for numerical identity. 
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central to his definition of constitution and his account is more fully developed, it will be 
more convenient to return to this issue in section 4.2 when discussing Lowe’s account. 
Doepke later adopted a different account in terms of non-causal explanation. As 
Doepke himself did not give a precise statement of this account, I will rely on Wasserman’s 
reconstruction of it and will replace Doepke’s own mereological condition with a simpler 
coincidence clause (this is harmless, for the reasons explained above): 
 
(Explanatory Account) x constitutes y iff 
(E1) x materially coincides with y, 
(E2) x is accidentally F, 
(E3) x’s being F explains the existence and persistence conditions of y52 
 
The Explanatory Account no more helps classify constitution as dependence relations via 
inclusion than does the Destruction Account, since their merelogical clause is the same. One 
might think, however, that E3 could help here. After all, the explanation of the existence and 
persistence conditions of y in terms of x’s being F is the kind of explanation metaphysicians 
invoke these days with ‘grounding’, ‘in virtue of’ and similar locutions. Moreover, grounding 
and ontological dependence are both hierarchical structuring relations. So, one might think, 
perhaps all along we should have counted something like grounding or metaphysical 
                                                
52 I am omitting Wasserman’s indices. I understand E1 in line with the above definition of coincidence. By 
‘accidentally’ I simply mean ‘contingently’; that is, E2 says Fx & ~□Fx. For Doepke’s own formulation, see The 
Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Arguments (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), at p. 
201. See also Noël B. Saenz “A grounding solution to the grounding problem,” Philosophical Studies, CLXXII, 8 
(2015), 2193–2214, at p. 2211 for an account similar in spirit to Doepke’s Explanatory Account. 
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explanation as a diagnostic tool for discovering ontological dependence, not the Disjunctive 
Constraint. 
Tempting as this line of thought may be, it is misguided. While some authors frequently 
use ‘grounding’ and ‘dependence’ interchangeably in informal contexts, this is simply a 
mistake; explanation and dependence are orthogonal notions. First, ontological dependence 
is not sufficient for explanation, not least because the former is a category-neutral notion, 
while the latter is restricted to facts or propositions. Second, and more importantly, 
ontological dependence also is not necessary for metaphysical explanation. There is no 
reason to expect that explananda would automatically depend on their explanantia in any 
interesting sense. Causal and non-causal overdetermination are cases in point: a multiply 
realizable going-on O is explained by but does not depend on any going-on (or its kind) Gi ∈ 
{G1…Gn}, yet each of G1…Gn is an individually sufficient determiner of O. While it might 
feel natural to speak of grounding/explanation and dependence in the same breath, this can 
only lead to confusion, and it is no accident that they are treated separately in the specialized 
literatures. So, the Explanatory Account gives us no reason to categorize constitution as a 
dependence relation.53 
                                                
53 That grounding, and determination in general, is not simply the converse of ontological dependence (or some 
restricted version of it) is now starting to be acknowledged more widely: see Tahko and Lowe, “Ontological 
Dependence,” op. cit., §5; Lina Jansson, “Explanatory Asymmetries, Ground, and Ontological Dependence,” 
Erkenntnis, LXXXII, 1 (2017), 17–44; Kerry McKenzie, “Structuralism in the Idiom of Determination,” 
forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, §5.1; and my own “The Deflationary Theory of 
Ontological Dependence,” Philosophical Quarterly, LXVIII, 272 (2018), 481–502, at pp. 481–2. By drawing the 
distinction I am not ruling out all conceptual connections between grounding and dependence; see, for 
instance, Correia, Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions, op. cit., at p. 66 and Benjamin Schnieder, “Grounding 
and Dependence,” forthcoming in Synthese, §3 and §5.1. 
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I have left to last an influential modal account by Lynne Baker. The account underwent 
a number of changes in the face of counterexamples to earlier formulations, but each version 
relies on two technical expressions. ‘Primary kind property F of x’ refers to the most specific 
kind property that x has and which determines its persistence conditions; following Baker, I 
will use ‘F*x’ as short for ‘x has F as its primary kind property’. I will also use the shorthand 
‘CuFx’ for ‘x is in F-favorable circumstances’, which for Baker means that x is in an 
environment that allows it to have F. ‘E’ is used for the existence predicate, ‘S’ for 
spatiotemporal coincidence and ‘B’ for being of a certain basic kind of stuff. Below, then, is 
a definition of constitution that closely follows Baker’s (as before, I am omitting time 
variables): 
 
(Kinds Account) ∀x∀y (Cxy ↔  
(K1) F*x & G*y & 
(K2) Sxy & ∀z [(Szx & G*z) →z = y)] & 
(K3) CuGx & 
(K4) □∀z [(F*z & CuGz) →  ∃v(G*v & Szv )] & 
(K5) ◊ [Ex & ~∃v(G*v & Svx)] & 
(K6) Bx → By)54 
 
This is a complicated definition, but it is easy to notice that it does not yield a notion of 
constitution that satisfies the Inclusion Constraint. In fact, it is even further from that goal 
than the previous definitions, since K2 requires spatial rather than mereological coincidence. 
                                                
54 Lynne R. Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 161 
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Baker considers this a virtue, since in her view constitution is entirely independent from 
mereology. Of course, given the plausible assumption that the mereological structure of 
objects is isomorphic to the structure of the space they occupy, K2 still entails that 
constituted objects mereologically coincide with their constituters. Still, nothing in Baker’s 
definition gives us the kind of asymmetry that would make constitution satisfy the Inclusion 
Constraint; beside spatial coincidence, all that K2 requires of a constituted object y is that it 
be the only object of its primary kind constituted by x at the time. This does not specify any 
sense in which constituted objects include their constituters but in which the constituters do 
not include what they constitute. Thus, by the Kinds Account constitution does not satisfy 
the Inclusion Constraint and consequently the Disjunctive Constraint. 
This closes my discussion of broadly modal accounts of constitution. None of these 
accounts justifies classifying constitution as a dependence relation. As we saw in section 3, 
the only way constitution could gain entry into our catalogue of dependence relations is by 
satisfying condition c) of the Disjunctive Constraint, that is, by constituted objects 
asymmetrically including their constituters in some sense (more precisely: at least those 
instances that violate Generic Necessitation would need to satisfy this constraint). But 
broadly modal accounts attempt to locate the asymmetry as modal or explanatory. And these 
sorts of asymmetries are simply not the right ones if we are looking for a relation that 
satisfies the Inclusion Constraint. In the next section, I will investigate whether non-
hylomorphist mereological accounts do any better. 
IV.2. Non-hylomorphist mereological accounts of constitution. Arguably the most well-known 
mereological account of constitution is J.J. Thomson’s, and goes as follows (modulo time 




(Mutual Parthood Account) x constitutes y iff 
(M1) x and y are parts of each other, 
(M2) x has some of its parts necessarily, but y has none of x’s parts necessarily, but 
(M3) not vice versa55  
 
The Mutual Parthood Account explicitly denies the antisymmetry of parthood, according to 
which ∀x∀y [(Pxy & Pyx) → x=y], that is, if x and y are parts of each other then x=y (here 
and throughout I use ‘P’ for ‘is a part of’). While perhaps this makes the material coincidence 
of x and y easier to make sense of, it does not license the intuition that y ontologically 
depends on x. Just like in the previous cases, the mereological relation between x and y is 
symmetric; the intuitive asymmetry of constitution is imposed by M2 and M3, which are 
modal conditions (and the wrong kinds of modal conditions to make constitution satisfy the 
Modal Constraint). 
It could be objected that M2 does bring with itself a kind of mereological asymmetry.56  
After all, constitutionally related objects stand in a mereological relation and there is a salient 
modal asymmetry between them. Couldn’t we then define up a mereological relation that 
holds between them asymmetrically? For example, the constituting object x bears the 
                                                
55 Cf. J.J. Thomson, “The Statue and the Clay,” Noûs, XXXII, 2 (1998), 149–173, at p. 157. A more formal 
statement goes as follows: ∀x∀y {Cxy ↔ 
(M1) Pxy & Pyx & 
(M2) ∃z{Pzx & □ (Ex → Pzx) & ∀v[Pvz → ◊ (Ey & ~Pvy)]} & 
(M3) ~{∃z[Pzy & □ (Ey → Pzy) & ∀v((Pvz → ◊ (Ex & ~Pvx))]}} 
This definition is equivalent to Thomson’s except for its omission of time variables. 
56 Thanks to a referee for raising a similar worry. Similar objections could be leveled against some of the above-
discussed attempts to locate the asymmetry, and my response to them is similar to my response to this one. 
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relation of having more of x’s parts necessarily to the constituted object y. This relation is both 
asymmetric and, in a salient sense, mereological – couldn’t it qualify as a kind of inclusion? I 
do not think so, for the same reason schmependence (as defined at the end of section 2) 
does not qualify as a kind of dependence. The mere presence of an asymmetry between 
some mereologically related objects does not make for an asymmetric mereological relation 
between them in the sense required by the Inclusion Constraint. Inclusion, as I characterized 
it, is proper parthood in the broadest possible sense, that is, in the sense assumed (again, 
perhaps mistakenly) by mereological pluralists. This includes a lot more than proper 
parthood between material objects (I mentioned propositional containment and property-
bundling as examples) but is still not liberal enough to include M2. Imposing an extra modal 
condition on improper parthood does not yield a relation that qualifies as a salient notion of 
proper parthood even by the lights of the most permissive mereological pluralists. I conclude 
that the Mutual Parthood Account does no better than the previously considered views in 
rendering constitution a dependence relation. 
The remaining two accounts I shall consider abandon modal notions altogether and 
attempt to capture the asymmetric nature of constitution entirely in terms of inclusive 
relations. Below I will discuss an influential proposal by E.J. Lowe. But before that, it will be 
instructive to discuss a similar account by Jens Harbecke, since (for reasons that will be clear 
later) Lowe’s account can be seen as a natural fix in response to a serious problem with 
Harbecke’s. The following formulation closely follows Harbecke’s: 
 
(Simple Parthood Account)  ∀x∀y {Cxy ↔ [∀z (Pzy → z∈x) & ~x=y]} 
 
In words: an object x constitutes another object y just in case they are numerically distinct 
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and every part of y is an element of x.57 This formulation stands in need of clarification. 
Unusually among constitution theorists, Harbecke thinks that constitution cannot be a 
relation between singular objects or between a piece of matter and an object; instead, it holds 
between a “set or collection […] of parts” and an object.58 Although Harbecke seems 
undecided between sets and collections in his informal exposition, his formal definition 
(which explicitly uses the ‘member of’ relation) suggests that he thinks of constitution as a 
relation that takes a set as its first relatum and a material object as its second relatum (note 
that on the plausible assumption that material objects are not sets, this makes redundant the 
requirement that the constituter and the constituted be distinct). 
There are two worries about this way of construing the constitution relation. The more 
immediate one is that it is extensionally inadequate. Despite disagreement on particular cases, 
there is broad consensus in the literature that constitution is a relation between concrete 
material things, that is, objects or pieces of matter – not a relation between a set and a 
material object. But even setting the category of the relata aside, the Simple Parthood 
Account is too liberal in what it classifies as cases of constitution. It implies, for example, 
that the set of all my parts (one of which is my ear) constitutes my ear. After all, since my ear 
is a part of me and parthood is transitive, every part of my ear is a member of the set of all 
my parts; thus, the first condition is satisfied. Moreover, my ear is not identical to the set of 
all my parts; thus, the second condition is satisfied too. Surely, though, my ear is not 
                                                
57 “Is Mechanistic Constitution a Version of Material Constitution?,” in Ken Aizawa and Carl Gillett, 
eds., Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Grounding (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016), pp. 91–121, at p. 108. 
Harbecke also adds a third criterion requiring that both the constituted and the constituting object exist, which I 
will ignore in what follows (and have all along been implicitly treating as trivially a condition of all putative 
definitions of constitution). 
58 Ibid., 106 
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constituted by the set of all my parts. 
Now, to be fair, ‘constitution’ is a technical term of art and philosophers have some 
wiggle room in how they wish to use it. But even if we put aside the worries about 
extensional adequacy, we face another problem: on Harbecke’s definition constituted objects 
do not include their constituters in any useful sense. If anything, the opposite is true: since 
everything is a part of itself and according to the Simple Parthood Account any part of a 
constituted object is a member of the set that constitutes it, it follows that constituted objects 
themselves are members of the set that constitutes them. So, constituted objects are included 
by their constituters, rather than including them. This means that on this account, too, 
constitution violates the Inclusion Constraint and cannot qualify as a dependence relation by 
way of satisfying it. 
These problems stem from two sources. One is Harbecke’s idiosyncratic view of 
constitution as a relation between a set and an object. The other is his misconstrual of the 
mereological asymmetry between the constituter and the constituted: to put it roughly, he 
thinks that the constituter includes all there is to the constituted object and some more, 
whereas intuitively it should be the other way round. E.J. Lowe’s mereological account 
(which, to be clear, predates Harbecke’s) is an improvement on both scores. It uses proper 
parthood (rather than just parthood) in the definiens and stipulates an extra condition of 
spatiotemporal coincidence. It goes as follows (modulo time variables, which I am omitting): 
 
(Proper Parthood Account) ∀x∀y [Cxy ↔ 
(P1) Sxy & 
(P2) ∀z (PPzx → PPzy) & 
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(P3) ~∀z (PPzy → PPzx)]59 
 
Informally, Lowe’s definition requires that constituted objects be spatially coincident and 
that every proper part of the constituter also be a proper part of the constituted object, but 
not vice versa. This definition does establish a mereological asymmetry between an object and 
its constituter with the intuitively right direction: there is “more to” the constituted object 
than its constituter. For example, a lump that constitutes the statue has various metal pieces 
as proper parts, and these are also proper parts of the statue; by contrast, the statue’s head or 
arms are not proper parts of the constituting lump (although the smaller pieces that 
constitute them are). We earlier saw that Doepke’s original version of the Destruction 
Account contained a similar asymmetry, so if Lowe’s Proper Parthood Account can help 
classify constitution as a dependence relation, so can Doepke’s.  
This raises the question of whether constituted objects include their constituters as 
proper parts according to the Proper Parthood Account. The answer is ‘No’. For take an 
object (Statue) constituted by another object (Lump). Suppose for reductio that Lump is a 
proper part of Statue. According to the principle of Weak Supplementation, whenever some 
x is a proper part of some y, there has to be a z that is also a proper part of y and is disjoint 
from x (where ‘disjoint from’ can be understood as ‘sharing no part with’). More precisely: 
 
(WS) ∀x∀y {PPxy → ∃z [PPzy & ~∃v (PPvz & PPvx)]} 
 
Applying WS to the case at hand, if Statue has Lump as a proper part it also has another 
proper part disjoint from Lump. But it is unclear what that proper part could be. By clause 
                                                
59 A Survey in Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at p. 73 
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P1, Statue spatiotemporally coincides with Lump. Although spatiotemporal coincidence does 
not imply mereological coincidence in the strict sense of Statue and Lump sharing all their 
parts, it does plausibly imply that there are some things (for example atoms and molecules) 
such that they jointly compose Lump and each part of Statue overlaps at least one of them. 
If that is the case, Statue does not have any part disjoint from Lump. Indeed, the parts that 
according to Lowe the statue has but its constituting lump does not (the statue’s arm, head, 
and so on.) still overlap the lump. Therefore, no proper part of a constituted object is 
disjoint from its constituter, contrary to WS. Thus, given WS, we can rule out our starting 
assumption that Lump was a proper part of Statue. If the Proper Parts Account is true, it is 
not the case that if x constitutes y then it is a proper part of y. Since (material) proper 
parthood is the only viable way constitution could satisfy the Inclusion Constraint, the 
Proper Parts Account does not allow us to classify constitution as a dependence relation via 
that constraint. 
At the time of proposing the Proper Parthood Account, Lowe himself accepted Weak 
Supplementation and accordingly thought that constituted objects had their constituters 
neither as proper nor as improper parts. One might therefore find it natural to abandon WS in 
order to be able to say that constituted objects do include their constituters as proper parts. 
Lowe did exactly that in a revision of his earlier account, where he renounced his 
commitment to WS.60 But this is a steep price to pay. I am inclined to think that proper 
                                                
60 In “Mereological Extensionality, Supplementation, and Material Constitution”, Monist, XCVI, 1 (2013): 131–
148, at p. 146 Lowe amends his original definition of constitution with the following condition: x and y do not 
stand in the relation defined by P1–P3 to a third object, z. In effect, this amendment implies that nothing can 
be simultaneously constituted by multiple objects. Given the standard examples of constitution, this seems like 
a bad result: on the constitution view of persons people are constituted by human animals, but they are also 
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parthood (at least between material objects) obeys Weak Supplementation as a matter of 
conceptual truth: the principle captures the deep-seated intuition that if x is a proper part of 
material object y, then there is “more to” y than x, and that x’s removal from y leaves a 
“remainder”. Once we deny this, we lose our grip on what it means for a material object to 
have proper parts. 
Obviously, this will not convince those who reject WS for theoretical reasons, nor is this 
the place to try to persuade them.61 But in what follows I will presuppose WS without 
argument, and those who are willing to give it up should feel free to read the rest of the 
paper as defending the following weaker conclusion: if constitution is a dependence relation, 
then either a mereological form of hylomorphism is true or WS is false. 
 
V. MEREOLOGICAL HYLOMORPHISM  
Broadly speaking, hylomorphism is the view that ordinary objects are matter-form 
compounds. This still leaves room for a number of different views along at least two 
different axes. First, opinions differ about what forms are: universals, particulars, or entities 
of a sui generis category that straddles this distinction? Second, there are different views on 
the relation between a compound’s matter and form. The two most salient options, which I 
will focus on here, are predication (the form of a matter-form compound is predicable of the 
matter of that compound) and parthood (matter-form compounds have forms as their 
                                                                                                                                            
constituted by mereological sums. I will not spend more time on this difficulty, though, since this fourth 
condition is independent of Lowe’s rejection of WS. 
61 See Aaron Cotnoir, “Strange Parts: The Metaphysics of Non-classical Mereologies,” Philosophy Compass, VIII, 9 
(2013): 834–845 for an overview of non-classical mereologies and a discussion of the analytic status (or 




For our present purposes, the important question is the latter one, namely, what the 
relation is between forms and matter-form compounds. Various considerations may inform 
our choice here, but in the present paper I am only interested in one: which version of 
hylomorphism can be used to give an account of constitution that allows us to classify it as a 
dependence relation? Note that it is one thing to be a hylomorphist and quite another to give 
a hylomorphist definition of constitution. For example, one might think that we should use 
the concepts of matter and form to replace the notion of constitution with something more 
serviceable that plays roughly the same theoretical roles.63 This is a defensible approach, but 
not one that addresses the main question of this paper. 
Hylomorphists with an interest in analyzing constitution typically say that constituted 
objects should be conceived of as matter-form compounds and their constituters as their 
matter.64 If so, the relation between the two could be used to analyze constitution. On the 
predicational view, this turns out to be the relation between a piece of matter, stripped of the 
                                                
62 Much of the forthcoming discussion, including the taxonomy, is indebted to Kathrin Koslicki (p.c.). 
63 Sattig (The Double Lives of Objects, op. cit., Chs. 1–2) takes this approach, although he defends a highly 
deflationary form of hylomorphism. 
64 For views along these lines, see Kit Fine, “Acts, Events and Things,” in Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Wittgenstein Symposium: Language and Ontology, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 97–105, “Things and Their 
Parts,” op. cit., and “Coincidence and Form,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. LXXXII, 1 (2008), 




form, and the same piece of matter with the form predicated of it.65 Notwithstanding the 
potential advantages of such a view, it does not justify calling constitution a dependence 
relation, since it does not make the relation satisfy the Inclusion/Feature constraint. First, 
the matter-form compound is not a feature of its constituent matter in the sense of 
characterizing it. To be sure, the form itself may be thought of as a feature of the matter (the 
form is the form of the matter it is predicable of). But that is not what’s needed to make 
constitution a dependence relation, since constitution is not the relation the matter bears to 
the form; it is the relation the matter bears to the matter-form compound. However, it is not 
appropriate to say that a matter-form compound is the matter-form compound of some 
matter: even if forms are predicable kinds of things, matter-form compounds themselves are 
not. Second, the matter-form compound does not strictly speaking include the matter. If it 
did, then given WS it would need to have a further proper part, but the only salient 
candidate for that is the form, which according to the predicational view is not a proper part 
of hylomorphic compounds. Now, to be sure, similarly to Lowe some hylomorphists reject 
WS in response.66 But for the reasons mentioned above, I do not think this is an acceptable 
answer. Again, I will not argue for the point here: if you think that dropping WS should not 
be off the table, you should read me as arguing that for those who want to recognize 
constitution as a dependence relation, the only alternative to the rejection of WS is to 
recognize both the matter and the form of a hylomorphic whole among its parts. 
                                                
65 See, for example, Michael J. Loux, “Aristotle on Form, Matter, and Ontological Strategy,” Ancient Philosophy, 
XXV, 1 (2005), 81–123. According to Johnston (“Hylomorphism,” op. cit.), forms are structural relations plurally 
predicable of the parts of a hylomorphic compound. 
66 See Johnston, “Hylomorphism,” op. cit. In “Response to Kathrin Koslicki,” dialectica, LXI, 1 (2007), 161–6, 
Fine also rejects WS, though for different reasons. 
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This brings me to mereological hylomorphism. The best-developed version of this view 
is found in Kathrin Koslicki’s work, who defines constitution as follows: 
 
(Mereological Hylomorphist Account of Constitution) Some objects, m1…mn, constitute an 
object O iff 
(H1) m1, …, mn are material parts of O 
(H2) There are some forms, f1…fn, which set the constraints under which they, along 
with some material parts, compose an object 
(H3) m1, …, mn satisfy the constraints set by f1, …,fn
67 
 
This view is somewhat unorthodox in that it characterizes constitution as a many-one 
relation between material parts and the whole they are material parts of. Those who think 
that constitution is strictly a one-one relation can simply define it as a special case of the 
relation specified by the Mereological Hylomorphist Account, namely the one where 
m1=m2=…=mn. Either way, on this account constituting objects are proper parts of the 
objects they constitute, thereby satisfying the Inclusion Constraint. 
That the Mereological Hylomorphist Account satisfies the Inclusion Constraint certainly 
removes an obstacle from constitution qualifying as a dependence relation, but it does not by 
itself imply that it is in fact a dependence relation. After all, I put forth the Disjunctive 
Constraint as a merely necessary condition of ontological dependence. Moreover, Koslicki 
does not say that constitution is a dependence relation, and some hylomorphists explicitly 
                                                
67 “The Structure of Objects,” op. cit., at p. 185 
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say things that appear to imply that it is not.68 To adjudicate this question we need something 
stronger than the Disjunctive Constraint. Below I will describe two substantive accounts of 
ontological dependence, each of which implies that constitution is a dependence relation. 
While I cannot defend either account in detail, I will give some reason to take them 
seriously. 
First, one could accept a kind of deflationary pluralism about ontological dependence. Such 
views are pluralistic in so far as they recognize several species of the relation, but they are 
also deflationary because they identify these species with familiar metaphysical relations that 
can themselves be understood without the idioms of dependence. A simple version of 
deflationary pluralism would take each clause of the Disjunctive Constraint to correspond to 
a species of ontological dependence, that is, each of rigid necessitation, generic necessitation, 
characterization (in the sense at issue in the Feature Constraint) and inclusion would itself be 
a type of ontological dependence. While it is difficult to find explicit endorsements of this 
view, the idea that composition is itself a kind of ontological dependence is a recurring 
theme in contemporary metaphysics, possibly driven by the intuition that “we enjoy a direct 
grasp on the nature of composition […] that makes a compositional approach to world-
                                                
68 Hylomorphism often comes as part of a general neo-Aristotelian package deal, part of which is the notion 
that ordinary objects are substances. Combined with the popular view that substances are ontologically 
independent, it follows that if constituted objects are substances then constitution cannot be a dependence 
relation. On the other hand, Koslicki rejects the independence criterion of substancehood (Form, Matter, 
Substance, op. cit., Ch. 6) and is at least open to the idea that constituted objects ontologically depend on their 
constituent matter (Ibid., at p. 163), though she is more agnostic about this than about the parallel thesis that 
they depend on their form. 
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building superior to any other approach”.69 If composition is itself a type of ontological 
dependence and constituted objects are (in part) composed of their constituters, as the 
Mereological Hylomorphist Account has it, it follows that constitution, too, is a dependence 
relation. 
I prefer a different view, which also takes as its starting point the general idea that 
composition is a kind of dependence but maintains that it is not a kind of ontological 
dependence.70 According to this view, which I call “Dependence Deflationism”, ontological 
dependence is something like a “weighted total” of certain non-ontological kinds of 
dependence: an entity x ontologically depends on another entity y just in case x bears 
sufficiently many non-ontological kinds of dependence relations to y and y does not bear too 
many to x. According to my preferred version of the view, the non-ontological types of 
dependence in question are asymmetric rigid necessitation, asymmetric generic necessitation, 
and “inclusion” in the sense circumscribed earlier (what counts as “sufficiently many” and 
“too many” are left unspecified because I take the concept of ontological dependence to be 
both context-sensitive and semantically vague). On this view, too, given the Mereological 
Hylomorphist Account it is plausible that constituted objects ontologically depend on their 
constituters. The constituter bears the proper parthood relation to the constituted object; the 
constituted object does not bear any non-ontological type of dependence (neither Rigid nor 
Generic Necessitation) to the constituter; and so, the weighted total of (non-ontological) 
                                                
69 L.A. Paul, “Building up the world from its fundamental constituents,” Philosophical Studies, CLVIII, 2 (2012), 
221–56, at p. 222. See also Jaegwon Kim, “Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence,” 
Philosophical Issues, V (1994): 51–69, at p. 67; Earl Conee and Theodore Sider, Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of 
Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 68; and Alexander Skiles “Against Grounding 
Necessitarianism,” Erkenntnis, LXXX, 4 (2015), 717–51, at p. 721. 
70 “The Deflationary Theory of Ontological Dependence,” op. cit. 
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dependence relations favors the ontological dependence of the constituted object on its 
constituter. 
These views share an important advantage. As I pointed out, modal and broadly 
inclusive relations are frequently used as sources of evidence for the presence and direction of 
ontological dependence.71 A simple explanation and justification of this practice is that these 
relations bear conceptual links to ontological dependence either by themselves being species 
of the relation (in line with Deflationary Pluralism) or by figuring in the weighted total that 
determines the direction of ontological dependence (as Dependence Deflationism has it). 
While this is not a conclusive argument for accepting one of these views, it gives us a strong 
reason to at least take them seriously.72 
This being said, endorsing either view would be a substantially stronger commitment 
than the fairly uncontroversial Disjunctive Constraint. Proponents of CLDQ who are 
unwilling to make this further commitment will have to find another way of bridging the gap 
between the Mereological Hylomorphist Account of constitution and the thesis that 
constitution is a dependence relation. All I have attempted to show in the last few 
paragraphs is that there are defensible theories of ontological dependence, which, in 
conjunction with Mereological Hylomorphism, allow us to infer this thesis. There may well 
be other accounts that could fill this role. Would-be proponents of CLDQ who shy away 
from going deflationary should read the foregoing discussion as an invitation to supply their 
own. 
                                                
71 Ibid., at pp. 497–8 
72 In fact I also defended a stronger claim: Dependence Deflationism gives better justice to the evidential 
weight of modal and inclusive relations in evaluating hypotheses about ontological dependence. However, for 





I started this paper with the intuitive and widely endorsed thesis that constitution is a 
dependence relation. To assess the plausibility of this thesis, I took a closer look at what its 
truth would require and adopted the Disjunctive Constraint as a minimal condition that any 
dependence relation has to satisfy. Then I went over a number of non-hylomorphist 
accounts of constitution and argued that on most of them, constitution does not satisfy the 
Disjunctive Constraint. So on these accounts even if constitution might superficially strike us 
as a dependence relation, in fact it is not. 
Those who want to classify constitution as a dependence relation ought to adopt a kind 
of mereological hylomorphism. I do not wish to pretend that this is the last word on the 
issue. Lowe’s revised version of the Proper Parthood Account, as well as certain non-
mereological hylomorphist views, might license the claim that constitution is a dependence 
relation at the cost of giving up Weak Supplementation. While I cannot in advance rule out 
further alternative views that could render constitution a dependence relation, the literature 
on the relation is already extensive enough to make the prospects of such an account 
relatively dim. 
Where does this leave us? While constitution is widely considered a dependence 
relation, it is surprisingly difficult to provide a precise characterization of the notion that 
justifies this intuition, and Mereological Hylomorphism may well be the only account that 
helps us justify it. But I leave it up to the reader what to make of this result. Some may think 
that it gives us ample reason to endorse Mereological Hylomorphism. Those initially hostile 
to hylomorphist views might simply accept the conclusion that constitution is not a 
dependence relation. Yet others might want to go as far as rejecting Weak Supplementation 
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to save the intuition that constitution is a dependence relation. Either way, I take myself to 
have shown something interesting. It should not be simply assumed that constitution is a 
dependence relation, and we should especially not assume this in advance of having an 
account of what constitution exactly is. 
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